Publications
Selected presentations
Research groups
Publications (selection)
Roige, Aida (2023): The Kinda Hard Problem for animal consciousness research. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-023-09912-3
Which non-human animals are phenomenally conscious? In this paper I argue that the distribution of phenomenal consciousness in the animal world is an unsolvable issue, because of an underlying problem inherent in the field: what I call the Kinda Hard problem. The Kinda Hard problem arises because the grounds on which we base our consciousness attributions to humans third-personally are either unavailable or ambiguous once we move to the animal case. Its nature is that of an epistemic problem: we cannot collect enough evidential grounds to justify attributions of phenomenal consciousness (and attributions of its lack) to non-human animals. Thus, it is impossible to ground rational belief one way or another regarding animal consciousness. This paper presents the problem and explains how it differs from other problems of consciousness.
Roige, Aida, and Carruthers, Peter (2019): Cognitive instincts versus cognitive gadgets: A fallacy. Mind & Language. 34: 540– 550. https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12251
The main thesis of Heyes' book is that all of the domain-specific learning mechanisms that make the human mind so different from the minds of other animals are culturally created and culturally acquired gadgets . The only innate differences are some motivational tweaks, enhanced capacities for associative learning, and enhanced executive function abilities. But Heyes' argument depends on contrasting cognitive gadgets with cognitive instincts , which are said to be innately specified. This ignores what has for some years been the mainstream nativist/anti‐empiricist view, which commits only to partially specified learning systems that become elaborated and built through domain‐specific learning.Jenkins, Carrie S.I., Heaton, Jasper; Roige, Aida (forthcoming). Art and emotions: romantic love. Chapter, in: Christy Mag Uidhir (ed): Art & Philosophy: New Essays at the Intersection. Oxford University Press. Draft available.
We claim that popular music has a(n often harmful) role in the construction of romantic love.Roige, Aida (2015): Intelligence and IQ testing. Entry in the Encyclopedia of Eugenics of the Living Archives on Eugenics Project, funded by the Research Council of Canada. Open access.
Intelligence, genius and mental ability were a cluster of traits that received much attention in eugenics discourse. Intelligence was regarded as one of the good qualities superior individuals possessed, in turn beneficial for society as a whole. On the other hand, the socially problematic or unproductive were identified as being of inferior mental quality: “feeble-minded”. By and large, eugenicists thought that (1) intelligence was a unitary psychological trait that could be measured, being quantified as an intelligence quotient (IQ); (2) intelligence was paired with educational achievement, reputation, and economic success; (3) a certain degree of intelligence was necessary to act morally and to foresee the consequences of one’s actions. Despite the prominent role of intelligence in the history of eugenics, there is considerable lack of clarity in what this general mental ability was considered to be.In preparation or under review
A paper on mechanistic explanation in cognitive science (R&R)
A paper on mental disorders
A paper on special science kinds
A paper on research misconduct
A paper on Marr's tri-level hypothesis and natural kinds in cognitive science
Some recent presentations:
Scientific Objectivity Workshop 2024, Barcelona, Spain, May 2024. Structural causes of research misconduct in contemporary science
XXI Inter-university workshop on Philosphy of Cognitive Science, Seville, Spain, April 2024. Commentary of Nick Byrd's "Socrates 2.0".
Invited talk at the Technical University Eindhoven, Netherlands, February 2024: Different accounts of mechanisms, or different sorts of mechanisms? Lessons from cognitive science.
Explaining Research Misconduct conference, Nancy, France, December 2023: A call for de-centralized decision-making in science.
International Society for the Philosophy of the Sciences of the Mind 2023 webconference, December 2023: Mental disorders as extreme reasons-irresponsiveness.
Ethics of Techonology ETEG workshop, Universität Wien, Vienna, July 2023: May we ever be in a position to know whether an AI is phenomenally conscious?
Buenos Aires Philosophical Perspectives on the Mind Sciences’ workshop, Argentina, May 2023: Mental disorders as extreme reasons-irresponsiveness.
Medical Grand Rounds, UM Capital Region Medical Center, August 2022: Patients' autonomy, surrogates, and advance directives.
Central APA, Chicago, February 2022: The Kinda Hard problem for animal consciousness research.
Eastern APA, Baltimore, January 2022: A mixed box: mechanisms in cognitive science.
Meeting of the International Society for History, Philosophy and Social Studies of Biology (ISHPSSB). Oslo, Norway, 2019: Carving the brain: are modules and mechanisms the same thing?
European Society for the History of Human Sciences (ESHHS). Budapest, Hungary, 2019: Eugenicist thought and the development of intelligence testing.
Philosophy of Science Association (PSA) meeting. Seattle, USA, 2018: Strategies to attribute phenomenal consciousness to animals, and where they fail.
(for a full list of presentations, see CV)
Research groups
I currently am a project member of the publicly financed research groups:
Senior member at LOGOS, a consolidated research group in analytic philosophy
Universitat de Barcelona. PI: Sven Rosenkranz
Reassessing Scientific Objectivity Research Group
Universitat de Barcelona. (2023- 2025) PIs: Carl Hoefer & Jose Díez
Autonomous University of Barcelona. (2023-2026) PI: Thomas Sturm
In the past, I had also been a project member of several others publicly financed research groups, including groups at UAB, UNED, Univ. of Alberta and Univ. of British Columbia, as well as a junior research fellow at the Philosophy institute of the Spanish National Research Council (CSIC).